The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Nov, 1985, Volume 53, Issue 6
https://doi.org/0012-9682(198511)53:6<1295:AAOHNU>2.0.CO;2-9
p. 1295-1314
Sergiu Hart
A set of axioms is proposed, which uniquely characterize the Harsanyi [5] solution for nontransferable utility (NTU) games. These axioms appear formally identical to those of Aumann for the Shapely ("@l-transfer") NTU value; the difference lies in the range of the two solutions. Further characterizations and comparisons between these two solution concepts are then presented.
