The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Nov, 2006, Volume 74, Issue 6
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00720.x
p. 1603-1636
Olivier Gossner, Penélope Hernández, Abraham Neyman
We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better‐informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.
