The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: Mar, 1982, Volume 50, Issue 2
https://doi.org/0012-9682(198203)50:2<325:SBIDPP>2.0.CO;2-X
p. 325-344
Guy Laroque, Paul Champsaur
Noncooperative strategic behaviors are studied in the Malinvaud-Dreze-de la Vallee Poussin decentralized planning procedure. We depart from the assumption of myopic behavior by assuming that every agent takes into account the effect over a given period of time [0, T] of his answers to the Center. One shows that, for T large, every Nash equilibrium of the ensuing game in intertemporal strategies approaches: (i) a competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy, and (ii) a Lindahl equilibrium in an economy with public goods. Thus, the Center loses any significant influence on the income distribution.
