Econometrica: Nov, 1995, Volume 63, Issue 6

Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting

https://doi.org/0012-9682(199511)63:6<1401:RACITR>2.0.CO;2-T
p. 1401-1419

Jonathan P. Thomas, Martin W. Cripps

Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.