The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
Econometrica: May, 2014, Volume 82, Issue 3
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11132
p. 1133-1151
Shaun Hargreaves Heap, David Rojo Arjona, Robert Sugden
We test the portability of level‐0 assumptions in level‐ theory in an experimental investigation of behavior in Coordination, Discoordination, and Hide and Seek games with common, non‐neutral frames. Assuming that level‐0 behavior depends only on the frame, we derive hypotheses that are independent of prior assumptions about salience. Those hypotheses are not confirmed. Our findings contrast with previous research which has fitted parameterized level‐ models to Hide and Seek data. We show that, as a criterion of successful explanation, the existence of a plausible model that replicates the main patterns in these data has a high probability of false positives.
This document provides additional information, data and analysis related to the paper. The material is divided as follows: Section I: Additional details about the implementation of the experimental design Section II: Screen shots of instructions, quizzes and decision tasks Section III: Additional analysis of position effects Section IV: Analysis restricted to games with neutral connotations Section V: Patterns in Hide and Seek data consistent with 'plausible' level-k models.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
