The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
In this Appendix we extend our results of the paper to a general family of single-peaked preferences (similar to those of Crawford and Sobel (1982), but adopted to the multidimensional state space). We show that when the conflict between the sender and the receiver is large, these preferences have similar characteristics to those of the lexicographic preferences analysed in the paper. We prove that communication is restricted in this environment as well.
This file contains supplementary results.
This file contains data sets and programs. See readme.pdf file for full description.
This supplementary document contains a formal analysis of some of the extensions briefly discussed in Section 5 of the published version. Section A1 considers the game in which agents receive signals about the size of past attacks. Section A2 considers the game with observable shocks to the fundamentals. Section A3 considers the variant in which agents observe the shocks with a one-period lag. Section A4 considers the game with short-lived agents in which the fundamentals follow a random walk. Finally, Section A5 collects the proofs of the formal results contained in this document.
