The Econometric SocietyEdited by: Guido W. Imbens • Print ISSN: 0012-9682 • Online ISSN: 1468-0262
This appendix contains extensions as well as derivations of more refined bounds on the tying function.
This appendix contains Monte Carlo simulations to assess the finite sample properties of the likelihood ratio test in the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This supplement contains the following details omitted from the main paper due to space constraints: (A) proof of the results in the paper, (B) auxiliary results and their proof, (C) additional alternative sequential algorithms, (D) the convergence properties of the NPL algorithm for models with unobserved heterogeneity, and (E) additional Monte Carlo results.
This appendix discusses the implementation details for MPEC and NFP applied to the BLP demand estimation problem, the KNITRO outputs for MPEC and NFP, how a researcher would adapt static MPEC to a likelihood-based estimation of random-coefficients-logit demand, varying the quality of the data, and dynamic BLP with one consumer type.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This appendix includes (i) a heuristic description of the approach of the paper, (ii) additional assumptions, (iii) proofs, and (iv) verification of the assumptions, additional tables and figures, and simulation details for (a) the ARMA (1,1) model, (b) the nonlinear regression model, and (c) the LIML example.
This zip file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This file contains the replication files for the manuscript.
This supplement contains proofs of some auxiliary Lemmas used to show Theorem 2.1. It also contains a proof of Theorem 2.2 and additional details regarding the empirical application. All notation is as established in the main paper unless noted otherwise. Equation numbering continues in sequence with that established in the main paper. References not included in the bibliography to the main paper are listed as well.
This appendix shows that the characterization of the maxmin payoff and posture (Theorem 1) continues to apply when the solution concept is strengthened from first-order knowledge of rationality to iterated conditional dominance, or when the continuous-time bargaining protocol of the text is replaced by any discrete-time bargaining protocol with sufficiently frequent offers.
A zip file containing the replication files for the manuscript.
Sample instructions for the subjects.
The replication files for the manuscript.
